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TAX COMMENT
sulting from its inability to arrive at a working rule with regard to the
problem of the corporate entity." 47 Although the statute does not
appear to be in conformity with the ruling in this case it may be
reconciled with a holding that "This section obviously has reference
* * * to a transfer of its entire assets * * * or to a transfer of a part
of the assets * * * that the corporation may thereafter be under one
control and may be operated substantially as one in the prosecution
of his business," 48 and that assets to be exempt from gain must be*
acquired through a reorganization and not through liquidating pro-
ceedings, 49 and that reorganization "indicated readjustments of exist-
ing interests." 50 Again the court may have held in conformance
with prior opinions that "earnings or profits of the original corpora-
tion remain for the purpose of distribution, earnings or profits of the
successor in liquidation" 51 and "tax exemptions are 'never lightly
inferred." 52
Apparently the ruling in the Gregory case appeared too late to
influence the Subcommittee of the Committee on Ways and Means in
its drastic recommendation to repeal all of Section 112 of the Reve-
nue Act in order to stay the tax evasions so prevalent under the
existing reorganization definitions.5 3 An opening attack on reorgan-
ization exemptions is to be found in the exclusion of Section 112 (g)
from the Revenue Act of 1934-the clause under which Gregory
claimed non-recognition of her gain.
IRVING DIAMoND.
OIL ANG GAs-DEPLETION.-In the first law imposing a tax
upon the net income of corporations there was contained a provision
permitting a deduction from gross income for depreciation of prop-
erty.1 The act by its terms made no provision for a deduction from
"Finkelstein, The Corporate Entity and the Income Tax (1935) 44 YALE
L. J. 436, 440. Discussion of the corporate entity in reorganizations.
'Lonsdale v. Commissioner, supra note 24, at 539. Italics our own.
"See Ahles Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 71 F. (2d) 150 (C. C. A. 2d
1934). Petitioner, a new corporation, issued all of its stock and bonds for the
old corporation's assets and the old corporation dissolved, leaving its sole
stockholder in control of the petitioner. Held, that it was a reorganization as
to petitioner who therefore did not acquire assets in liquidation proceedings.
W Cortland Specialty Co. et al. v. Commissioner, supra note 23, at 939.
Commissioner v. Sansome, 60 F. (2d) 931 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932), at 933.
"Heiner v. Colonial Trust Co., 275 U. S. 236, 237, 48 Sup. Ct. 80 (1927).
' Preliminary Report of the Subcommittee of the Committee on Ways and
Means, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 8, 9. Recommends "that the exchange and
reorganization powers contained in Sec. 112 of existing law be abolished. * * *
First it will close the door to one of the most prevalent methods of tax
evasions."
1Cou'omTioN _xcIsE LAW OF 1909, §38, 36 Stat. 112, 113. This act pre-
ceded the Sixteenth Amendment and was held to levy an excise tax, not an
income tax. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. 342 (1911)
(1934) 9 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 228.
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gross income for the depletion 2 of mines, oil and gas wells, and
timber lands in arriving at the net income of corporations engaged in
exploiting these natural resources, and it was later held 3 that the
term "depreciation" as used in the act was not sufficiently broad to
include losses sustained by tlhe exhaustion of deposits of minerals,
oil, gas, and timber.
The harsh effect of the decision was somewhat alleviated by the
provision in the subsequent law 4 that there should be a "reasonable
allowance" for the depletion of certain stated natural resources. The
depletion allowance therein provided for was continued in the fol-
lowing law,5 but in the Revenue Act of 1918 6 an alternative deple-
tion allowance based upon the "discovery value" of the property was
permitted in those cases where mineral deposits were discovered on
and after March 1, 1913. This new depletion provision was found
to be difficult of application 7 and was abandoned in 1926, in which
year Congress provided that there should be a depletion allowance of
27Y per cent. of the gross income from the property for the taxable
year." The change made by this law was welcomed by both taxpayers
and Treasury officials, for the execution of the old law made it
'The following explanation of the economic necessity for a depletion
allowance is contained in an article by H. A. Campbell, Depletion of Oil and
Gas Properties Under the Act of 1926 (1927) 5 NAT. IN. TAX MAG. 51: "In
any given space or area there are a definite number of units of coal, mineral
or petroleum, the ascertainment of which is an estimate based on engineering
investigations or surveys. Once removed these units can never be replaced and
the taxpayer, extracting or withdrawing these units is gradually approaching
a termination of his business existence unless there is formulated a policy of
acquisition of additional units in a new area. To acquire such new units it is
necessary to establish a reserve of capital which can be used for this purpose.
The logical and only practicable method is to establish a depletion reserve, not
only to enable the taxpayer to continue his useful and successful business life,
but also to insure a supply of his products for the use of the nation. This
reserve can only be established after the current operating needs are met. The
taxpayer must first expend the necessary money to produce the oil or other
mineral, and then set aside a fund to provide for a program of orderly develop-
ment, operating and overhead expenses, depreciation on equipment, interest on
indebtedness, and dividends. After providing for these items, it is imperative
that there be established a reserve of monies with which to acquire additional
units."
'Von Baumbach v. Sargent Land Co., 242 U. S. 503, 37 Sup. Ct. 201
(1917); (1928) 6 NAT. IN. TAX MAG. 54.
'INcOME TAX LAW OF 1913, §2B, G (b), 38 Stat. 166, 167, 172. The law
was held to be valid even though in some cases the maximum depletion allow-
ance was less than the actual depletion. Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240
U. S. 103, 36 Sup. Ct. 278 (1916) ; (1917) 30 HARv. L. REV. 526.
'REv. AcT OF 1916, §§5 (a) (8), (12) (a) (2), 39 Stat. 756, 759, 768.
'REv. AcT OF 1918, §§214 (a) (10), 234 (a) (9), 40 Stat. 1057, 1067, 1078.
Substantially the same provisions were re-enacted in the REv. ACT OF 1921,
§§214 (a) (10), 234 (a) (9), 42 Stat. 227, 241, 256; REv. AcT OF 1924,
§§204 (c), 214 (a) (9), 234 (a) (8), 43 Stat. 253, 260, 270, 284, 26 U. S. C.
§§935 (c), 955 (a) (9), 986 (a) (8).
1 REPORT No. 52, Finance Comm., U. S. Senate, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.,
p. 17 (1926).
1 REv. AcT OF 1926, §204 (c) (2), 44 Stat. 9, 14, 26 U. S. C. 935 (c) (2).
TAX COMMENT
necessary for the taxpayer to submit and the government to scru-
tinize costly and voluminous engineering data to substantiate the
claim of fair market value at the date of discovery based upon the
probability of productiveness as of such date.9
During all these years there had been coupled with the provision
for a reasonable allowance for depletion of natural resources a clause
stating that in the case of leases the deductions were to be equitably
apportioned between the lessor and lessee.10 With the enactment of
the provision for an arbitrary depletion allowance the question arose
whether the requirement that the deduction be equitably apportioned
between lessor and lessee had any bearing on the case of a taxpayer-
lessee who claimed the arbitrary deduction, or whether it had appli-
cation only to the one who claimed a "reasonable allowance" for
depletion. There likewise was presented the problem whether an
amount secured by a lessor as a bonus under a long-term lease of oil
and gas property was subject to a depletion allowance of 27Y2 per
cent. during a year in which no oil was drilled.
The answer to the first problem depends upon the construction
placed upon the words "gross income from the property." If we are
to include within the meaning of that phrase all the income received
by the lessee from all uses of the property, including the sums which
the lessee is obliged to pay to the lessor as rents or as royalties. there
will be an incongruous situation created in that there will be allowed
by the government a 27/ per cent. depletion allowance on more than
the full value of oil and gas products, or, expressed differently, the
government will permit a depletion allowance to the extent of more
than 272 per cent. of the gross income from oil and gas.'" The
Supreme Court held 12 that from the legislative history of the several
revenue laws and the departmental interpretation thereof it was evi-
dent that Congress intended to limit the phrase "gross income from
the property" to the gross income from oil and gas, as distinguished
from the entire income from sources other than oil and gas. The
' Campbell, op. cit. mtpra note 2, at 71.
'o Supra notes 5, 6 and 8. The provision in the 1926 law reads: "In the
case of leases the deductions allowed by this paragraph shall be equitably appor-
tioned between the lessor and lessee." REv. AcT OF 1926, §234 (a) (8), 44
Stat. 9, 42, 26 U. S. C. §986 (a) (8).
'Assume that T leases oil and gas property from L under an agreement
whereby T is to pay to L 50 per cent. of the gross income of the property. In a
given year the gross income is $100,000. Of this sum $50,000 is due to L. If
T is allowed to claim the statutory depletion allowance on the gross income, he
will receive a depletion allowance of $27,500. Similarly, when L receives the
$50,000 in royalties, he will be entitled to a depletion allowance of 27Y per
cent. of said amount, or $13,750. In other words, on a gross income of $100,000
there will have been allowed by the government a depletion deduction of
$41,250, or 41% per cent.
"Helvering v. Twin Bell Oil Syndicate, 293 U. S. 312, 55 Sup. Ct. 174
(1934), rev'g Twin Bell Oil Syndicate v. Helvering, 70 F. (2d) 402 (C. C. A.
9th, 1934), which reversed Twin Bell Oil Syndicate v. Com'r of Int. Rev.,
26 B. T. A. 172 (1932).
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court traced the history 1 3 of the various revenue acts and, by close
attention to details in the construction of these laws and particularly
those later laws which contain amendments 14 designed to remove the
uncertainty caused by the Revenue Act of 1926, it reached its conclu-
sion that the depletion allowance of 272 per cent. was subject to
equitable apportionment between the lessor and lessee.15
The solution of the problem whether a lessor of oil and gas
property is entitled to a depletion allowance in respect to a bonus
received from the lessee during a taxable year in which the land is
not productive and is not likely to become so is dependent upon the
result which would follow refusal to allow a depletion deduction.'"
If the law were so framed as to provide that in case the land were
to produce large quantities of oil and gas in a subsequent year the
taxpayer might in such year have full allowance for the actual deple-
tion suffered in such year, no injustice would be done to him in
requiring him to forego a depletion allowance upon a bonus received
during a year in which no oil or gas was produced. However, it is
settled that the depletion allowance permitted by the statute may be
availed of only during the year in which the depletion actually
occurred and that deductions which were not allowed in one year
'a Helvering v. Twin Bell Oil Syndicate, supra note 12, at 315 et seq.
' "In the case of oil and gas wells the allowance for depletion shall be
27Y2 per centum of the gross income from the property during the taxable year,
excluding from such gross income an amount equal to any rents or royalties
paid or incurred by the taxpayer in respect of the property." REv. AcT OF
1932, §114 (b) (3), 47 Stat. 169, 202, 26 U. S. C. §114 (b) (3).
"This amendment makes it clear that in computing the gross income from
the property, the allowance for percentage depletion in the case of oil and gas
wells, there shall be excluded from such gross income an amount equal to
any rents or royalties paid or incurred by the taxpayer in respect of the
property.". REPORT No. 1492, Conference Comm., House of Rep., 72d Cong.,
1st Sess., p. 14 (1932).
In the REv. AcT oF 1934, §114 (b) (3), 48 Stat. 680, 710, 26 U. S. C. §114
(b) (3), the section was further clarified by the insertion after the word
"depletion" of the words "under section 23 (m)." The section referred to is
the provision which permits a "reasonable allowance" for depletion.
' It is the opinion of the writer that had no correcting amendment been
passed prior to the decision in the present case the reversal of the lower court
would not have been unanimous. The fact that a later Congress declared that
the amendment was V'corrective" and not a change from the law of 1926 may
have had some weight with the court. But is it proper to be guided by the
declarations of a subsequent Congress in reference to a poorly expressed intent
of a Congress which had long passed out of existence? There would appear to
be occasion to apply the principle of law that inconsistencies and ambiguities
in a tax law are to be construed in the taxpayer's favor.
" The Treasury Department had established the rule that a depletion
allowance was to be permitted only in case future production was practically
assured by reason of the existence of nearby wells and geological indications
or oil or gas in some amount, however small, was produced during the taxable
year. If the producer's chance of securing oil or gas was speculative and no
oil or gas was produced during the taxable year, then no depletion allowance
was made even though in a subsequent year the land yielded large quantities.
G. C. M. 11384, XII-1 Cum. Bull. 64 (1933).
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may not be claimed in a subsequent year; 17 therefore, extraordinary
depletion in one year may not be compensated for beyond the sums
actually received by the lessor during such year. It would follow
from this premise that a lessor would be denied the statutory
depletion deduction in cases where the land suffered no actual deple-
tion and would be permitted to claim the full allowance if only a few
barrels of oil or a few cubic feet of gas were produced.18
The Supreme Court refused to give its sanction to any such
unreasonable rule and held that such bonus payments should be sub-
ject to a depletion allowance during the year in which they were
received,19 and left open for future determination whether a lessor
who has received a bonus on oil and gas lands which were never
productive during the term of the lease may in the final year of the
lease be obliged to pay a tax upon those sums which had been
previously free from taxation as depletion allowances.
JOHN F. MITCHELL.
TAXATION-DEDUcTION OF AmORTIzED COMMISSIONS ON BONDS
ISSUED PRIOR TO 1913.-Prior to 1913, the taxpayer sold three issues
of bonds at a discount and paid to bankers an additional amount as
commissions for marketing the bonds. The taxpayer kept its books
and made its tax returns on the accrual basis. A deduction from
gross income representing the amortized amount of the commissions
and discount was disallowed by the Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue who found a deficiency in each of the taxable years, 1918 to
1923 inclusive. The Board of Tax Appeals ruled that the petitioner
was entitled to the deduction for the discount, but not for commis-
I, "The tax is an income tax for 1918, and in the absence of express
provision to the contrary, it is not to be supposed that the taxpayer is author-
ized to deduct from this year's income depreciation, depletion, business losses
or other similar items attributable to other years." Burnet v. Thompson Oil &
Gas Co., 283 U. S. 301, 306, 51 Sup. Ct. 418 (1931).
Dissenting opinion of Sibley, J., in Herring v. Com'r of Int. Rev., 70
F. (2d) 785, 788 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934).
The injustice of the rule may be seen in this supposed case:
L leases oil and gas property to T for five years. L is to receive 25 per
cent. of the income in royalties and is to receive each year $50,000 as a bonus
or advance royalty, such amount to be credited upon sum due to L from T
when production is actually commenced. For four years T fails to commence
drilling. During each year L receives $50,000, or a total of $200,000. During
the final year T produces $800,000 worth of oil. L's share of this is one-fourth,
or $200,000, which he has already received. Therefore, during the final year L
has no income from the property and has been deprived of any depletion
allowance. Yet, had T produced one barrel of oil during each year, L would
have been entitled to a full depletion allowance.
"Herring v. Com'r of Int. Rev., 293 U. S. 322, 55 Sup. Ct. 179 (1934).
rev'g Herring v. Com'r, supra note 18.
